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Poznań School of Banking
This chapter analyzes the formal institutions of corporate gover-
nance for pension plans. It applies this analysis to open pension funds, 
which are mandatory individual account plans, operating in Poland. 
Each pension fund has a specifi c institutional arrangement, which de-
termines to a large extent its effectiveness. Such an arrangement sets 
the pension fund under the infl uence of many stakeholders. The pri-
mary objective of regulations in the governance area of pension funds 
becomes a minimization of potential agency problems—confl icts of 
interest that may arise between the pension participants and those re-
sponsible for the fund’s management.
PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM
In agency theory, agency relationships are understood as contracts 
under which a principal engages a third party (agent) to perform cer-
tain actions on their behalf in dealing with a second party, which is the 
provider of the service. The essence of agency theory can be reduced to 
two basic assumptions. First, expectations and objectives of principal 
and agent are various and remain in confl ict (difference of interests, 
different objective function). Second, it is very diffi cult and expensive 
for the principal to check the agent’s work. In agency theory the basic 
concept is the agency relationships (Szczepański 2010). 
In pension arrangements, the plan participant is the principal, the 
plan sponsor is the agent, and the fi nancial institution managing the 
pension funds is the second party. This implies the need for the princi-
pal to delegate certain powers to the agent to make certain decisions. 
up14msssapch13.indd   287 1/31/2014   10:44:02 AM
288   Samborski
Then an agency relationship arises, which can be a public contract 
(formal, explicit) or an implicit contract (informal). The purpose of the 
contract is to ensure such actions of the agent so that he/she strives to 
maximize the principal’s benefi ts. However, between the agent and the 
principal there is an asymmetry of information. This can lead to the 
agency problem, which usually occurs in two situations: hidden action 
of the agent, and hidden information or hidden knowledge possessed by 
the agent (Mesjasz 2002). In the fi rst situation, the agent takes action, 
the course or outcome of which cannot be observed by the principal, 
resulting in the risk of moral hazard (the inclination of someone who is 
imperfectly checked to take part in behavior which may be dishonest or 
undesirable). In the second situation, the agent has information about 
environment variables, which the principal does not have before or after 
the conclusion of the contract. Ex ante asymmetry can lead to adverse 
selection, with the party having the superior information benefi ting at 
the expense of the party with inferior information (Mesjasz 2002). 
Agency problems can be prevented by concluding a complete con-
tract, which will take into account all possible aspects and options of 
future situations. However, drawing up a complete contract is not feasi-
ble. Thus, we are dealing with incomplete contracts between principals 
and agents (Mesjasz 2002).
Agency problems can be limited in three ways:
1) reduction of information asymmetry,
2) seek harmonization between the principal’s and the agent’s ob-
jectives, and
3) building trust.
There are two options for reducing information asymmetry: 
screening (the principal keeps track of the agent in the corporation) 
and signaling (the agent gives specifi c signals to the principal, such 
as reports). Second, the interests of the principal and the agent can be 
harmonized by introducing incentive schemes (such as managerial op-
tions). Third, the agency problem can be reduced by agents building 
reputational capital that they want to maintain (Brink 2007).
Shaping the behavior of the agent in such a direction that his or her 
actions diverge from the principal interest as little as possible requires 
incurring certain costs, including drawing up contracts, monitoring and 
controlling the conduct of the agent by the principal, ensuring the inter-
ests of the principal, and residual loss (Aluchna 2002).
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AGENCY PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AND 
WAYS TO LIMIT IT
Three levels of retirement provision can be distinguished under 
pension plans. The fi rst two are mandatory and consist of redistributive 
and saving parts. The third, however, is voluntary: individual or occu-
pational. The fi rst level, redistributive, includes programs to ensure the 
minimum subsistence level for pensioners. The second level, savings, 
is designed to provide pensioners with a target retirement standard of 
living comparable to that when they were economically active. Within 
these levels, the programs are further classifi ed by source (public, pri-
vate), or the way to determine the pension benefi ts (Samborski 2011).
The following discussion addresses the second level—more pre-
cisely, private pension plans and funds—and the third level of pension 
provision. (The discussion does not apply to pension plans fi nanced 
using book reserves, as in Germany.)
Assuming that the pension fund, like any organization, is a nexus of 
contracts, one can identify different expectations of pension funds stake-
holders, but also areas of potential confl icts (Hess and Impavido 2004). 
Pension fund governance is, therefore, a mirror image of corporate gov-
ernance in joint stock companies, which consists of a set of relations 
between the company’s management, supervisory board, shareholders, 
and other stakeholders (OECD 2002). Pension fund governance, as well 
as corporate governance, deals with the posting of property rights by 
the principal to the agent, and consequently relies on the professional 
skills and management effectiveness of the agent (World Bank 2007). 
Private pension plans operate on the basis of the agency relationship 
between the plan members and benefi ciaries, and the persons or entities 
involved in administering or funding it (such as a plan administrator or 
a plan sponsor). Governance under such plans includes all of the rela-
tionships between the entities and persons involved in the operation of 
a retirement plan, and it provides the structure through which the objec-
tives of the retirement plan are established and the means to meet those 
objectives (OECD 2002).
Pension fund governance deals with issues of pension fund control 
and seeks to answer two basic questions: 1) in whose interests should 
checks on pension funds be carried out, and 2) who should monitor 
up14msssapch13.indd   289 1/31/2014   10:44:05 AM
290   Samborski
and control the pension funds on behalf of their members? The basic 
principles of corporate governance are applicable here: transparency, 
accountability, fairness, and responsibility (World Bank 2007). 
Nonetheless, pension fund governance is much more complex than 
corporate governance because of the larger number of parties directly 
involved in pension fund operations. Therefore, all the rules of cor-
porate governance do not apply here. Pension fund members do not 
generally exercise control through voting on fund administration, asset 
management companies, and their employees. It is diffi cult for fund 
members to dismiss a body managing the fund if it fulfi lls its duties im-
properly. In such cases the only solution for fund members is to change 
the fund or make claims for damages (World Bank 2007).
Governance in private pension plans and funds includes managerial 
control of the organization and means of regulation, including liability 
of management, and how it is monitored. The primary objective of reg-
ulation in pension funds governance is to reduce the potential agency 
problems or confl icts of interest that may arise between fund members 
and those responsible for managing the fund, which could negatively 
affect the security of retirement savings (Stewart and Yermo 2008). 
From this perspective, pension fund governance comes down to two 
issues: to protect the rights and interests of pension funds members, and 
to ensure the safety of sources of funding for future retirement benefi ts 
(World Bank 2007). It is worth considering, however, whether pension 
fund governance should be limited to minimizing the agency problems 
occurring between pension fund members and the entity responsible for 
managing the fund.
 The pension fund can be considered as a nexus or network of ex-
plicit and implicit contracts between all entities in the relationship with 
it. Hence, pension fund governance cannot be confi ned only to deal 
with agency problems; its aim should be understood broadly to ensure 
good performance of the pension fund while maintaining low costs for 
all stakeholders (Stewart and Yermo 2008). Good governance, there-
fore, should be correlated with high rates of return on investment and 
low cost of capital (World Bank 2007). 
Good governance of pension funds has a lot of benefi ts, which in-
clude building trust between all stakeholders, and reducing the need for 
specifi c regulations or facilitating supervision. It is also conducive to 
improving the effi ciency of corporate governance in portfolio compa-
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nies. The better managed the pension fund, the greater the opportunity 
to multiply the value of investments through the policy of active share-
holders. Good governance in the pension fund must take into account 
the risk. The more sophisticated the investment strategies, the stricter 
and stronger the pension plan supervision must be (Stewart and Yermo 
2008). The basis of pension fund operations should be, therefore, trust 
and development of long-term relationships with all stakeholders.
In pursuing these objectives, it is worth looking at the Guidelines 
for Pension Fund Governance elaborated by the OECD. The guidelines 
contained in them may be useful in the implementation of strategies for 
building trust and developing long-term relationships with all stake-
holders. These guidelines are divided into two groups: governance 
structure and governance mechanisms. 
Governance structure should provide the appropriate division of 
operational and supervisory responsibilities, and defi ne the responsi-
bilities and abilities of those entrusted to pension fund responsibilities 
(OECD 2002). Thus, it includes the following eight points:
1) Identifi cation of responsibilities. There should be a clear 
identifi cation and separation of operational and oversight re-
sponsibilities in the governance of a pension fund. 
2) Governing body. Every pension fund should have a govern-
ing body vested with the power to administer the pension fund 
and which is ultimately responsible for ensuring the adherence 
to the terms of the arrangement and the protection of the best 
interest of plan members and benefi ciaries. 
3) Accountability. The governing body should be accountable to 
the pension plan members and benefi ciaries, its supervisory 
board (where relevant), and the competent authorities. 
4) Suitability. Membership in the governing body should be sub-
ject to minimum suitability (or nonsuitability) standards in order 
to ensure a high level of integrity, competence, experience, and 
professionalism in the governance of the pension fund.
5) Delegation and expert advice. The governing body may rely 
on the support of subcommittees and may delegate functions to 
internal staff of the pension entity or external service providers.
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6) Auditor. An auditor, independent of the pension entity, the gov-
erning body, and the plan sponsor, should be appointed by the 
appropriate body or authority to carry out a periodic audit con-
sistent with the needs of the arrangement. 
7) Actuary. An actuary should be appointed by the appropriate 
body or authority for all defi ned benefi t plans fi nanced via pen-
sion funds.
8) Custodian. Custody of the pension fund assets may be carried 
out by the pension entity, the fi nancial institution that manages 
the pension fund, or by an independent custodian (OECD 2009). 
Pension funds should have appropriate control mechanisms, 
communication, and incentives to encourage good decision making, 
proper and timely implementation, and regular reviews and assessments 
(OECD 2002). The mechanisms of governance include the following:
• Risk-based internal controls. There should be adequate internal 
controls in place to ensure that all persons and entities with op-
erational and oversight responsibilities act in accordance with 
the objectives set out in the pension entity’s bylaws, statutes, 
contract, or trust instrument, or in documents associated with 
any of these, and that they comply with the law.
• Reporting. Reporting channels between all the persons and en-
tities involved in the governance of the pension fund should be 
established in order to ensure the effective and timely transmis-
sion of relevant and accurate information.
• Disclosure. The governing body should disclose relevant infor-
mation to all parties involved (notably pension plan members 
and benefi ciaries, plan sponsors, supervisory authorities, and 
auditors,) in a clear, accurate, and timely fashion (OECD 2009).
ADDRESSING THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN PENSION FUNDS 
IN LIGHT OF POLISH EXPERIENCE
This analysis of governance solutions in pension funds in Poland 
is limited to open pension funds (see Figure 13.1), which are manda-
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tory individual account pension plans. Through the pension funds, part 
of the employee’s earnings (collected by the Social Insurance Institu-
tion—it also manages the public pension plan) is invested in individual 
accounts. These accounts are managed by one of several funds. Em-
ployees buy from their fund a retirement annuity, which, when they 
retire, will serve as a source of retirement income. The amount of annu-
ity depends on the amount of cash accumulated during one’s career and 
the effectiveness of their investment.





• Age determines membership of old or new scheme.
• The new system is based on notational accounts.
Private pensions: personal:
• Open pension fund (OFE).
Private pensions: occupational:
• Employee pension fund (PPE).
Private pensions: personal:
• Individual retirement account (IKE, IKZE).
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Open pension funds can be created only by a general pension soci-
ety (hereafter Society) acting as a joint stock company. The dominant 
shareholders of general pension societies are fi nancial institutions, in-
cluding international insurance companies, Polish fi nancial institutions, 
and various consortia of Polish and international fi nancial institutions 
(Kerner and Reinhardt 2010). The duration of the fund is unlimited. 
The fund acquires a legal personality upon being entered in the register 
of funds, then the fund authority becomes the Society. The basic docu-
ment governing the internal affairs prevailing in the fund is the Articles 
of Association.
The objectives of the company are solely devoted to the creation 
and management of funds and their representation to third parties. The 
general society creates and manages (for a fee) only one open fund. The 
share capital of the company cannot be raised by public subscription. A 
purchase or acquisition of company’s shares requires an approval of a 
supervisory authority, which is the Financial Supervision Commission.
The governing bodies of the Society are the Management Board, the 
Supervisory Board, and the general meeting. The Management Board 
of the Society cannot have fewer than three members, and it may also 
have an audit committee. Unless the Articles of Association provide 
otherwise, the general society board members are appointed and dis-
missed by the general meeting. The member of the Management Board 
must be a person who meets the following requirements:
• has full legal capacity;
• has not been convicted of an offense against property, credibil-
ity of documents, business transactions, trading in money and 
securities, tax offense;
• has higher education;
• holds a work experience of no less than seven years; and
• gives guarantee of the due performance as the board member.
At least one-third of the board should hold a university degree in 
law, economics, or be included in the list of investment advisors. 
The Supervisory Board member of the Society must be a person 
who meets the requirements for the management board members in the 
fi rst two points and gives guarantee of due performance as a member of 
the Supervisory Board. At least half of the Society Supervisory Board 
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members should have a degree in law or economics. Moreover, at least 
half of the members of the general pension society are appointed from 
outside of shareholders of the Society and other related entities. The So-
ciety is responsible to the members of the fund for any damage caused 
by failure to perform or improper performance of their duties in manag-
ing the fund and its representation. The membership of the open fund 
follows the conclusion of the contract with the fund (Act of 28 August 
1997).
The pension society receives from the pension fund a fee levied in 
the form of a percentage deduction from the amount of premiums (con-
tributions) paid, not more than 3.5 percent, except that the deduction is 
made before the conversion of contributions into accounting units. In 
addition, the pension society charges a fee at the rate specifi ed in the 
Articles of Association. This rate cannot exceed the amount calculated 
according to the scale specifi ed by law. The rates of management fees 
decrease with each increase in fund assets exceeding the successive as-
sets thresholds by the fund. Costs related to transactions of purchase or 
sale of fund assets and costs associated with the storage of assets by the 
depositary are covered by the fund assets. In addition, pension societies 
incur a fee for the contributions transfer and the costs of supervision 
and the Insurance Ombudsman. There is also the cost of the guarantee 
fund that insures the pension funds (Sołdek 2011).
The pension fund invests its assets in accordance with the law, 
seeking to achieve a maximum degree of safety and profi tability of the 
investments made. The legislature defi nes the investment limits. 
The open fund, which has received contributions for at least 36 
months, determines each year at the end of March and September the 
rate of return for the last 36 months and reports it to the supervisory 
body. On this basis, the supervisory body calculates the weighted aver-
age rate of return of all open-end funds and releases that information to 
the public. The weighted average rate of return is the basis for calculat-
ing the minimum required rate of return that applies for all open pension 
funds. When the rate of return of an open pension fund for the period of 
36 months is smaller than the minimum required rate of return, a defi cit 
arises in an open fund, which sponsors of the open fund will pay. 
The fund is obliged to choose a depositary, to whom, by an agree-
ment, it entrusts the storage of its assets. A depositary can only be a 
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bank. The agreement with the depositary for the fund assets storage 
should specify in detail the duties of a depositary and the fund.
The open fund is obliged to publish a prospectus once a year in 
a national daily newspaper dedicated to the fund announcements and 
advertising. The fund’s prospectus should contain its Articles of As-
sociation, information on the fund’s investment performance, and 
approved annual fi nancial statements of the fund. The Society and the 
fund provide periodic reports to the supervisory authority and current 
information on their activities and fi nancial position (Act of 28 August 
1997).
CONCLUSION
The basic sources of confl icts of interest in the pension funds occur 
in the relationships between fund members and the management entity 
on the amount of fees charged by the Society.
The pension fund is a legal entity. The managing body of the fund 
is the pension society established as a joint stock company. Such a 
solution entails reducing the effi ciency of the management authority 
focused on the best interests of pension plan members. Pension funds 
have been established in the majority of cases by the general pension 
societies in which dominant shareholders are fi nancial institutions. As 
a result, fi nancial institutions easily introduce their candidates to the 
supervisory boards of societies. It may turn out that the fi nancial institu-
tion controls both the Supervisory Board and the Management Board. 
Therefore, it is proposed to take steps aimed at increasing the indepen-
dence of supervisory boards in general pension societies.
Furthermore, the low level of society’s economic awareness and the 
low interest in retirement issues encourage societies to undertake ex-
pensive marketing campaigns to attract as many members as possible. 
Such campaigns usually lead not to improved investment performance 
of the fund but to higher administrative costs and fees incurred by fund 
members. Hence, I propose a statutory reduction of fees that pension 
societies charge, and linking their pay to the results of open pension 
funds investment. In addition, greater emphasis should be laid on fi nan-
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cial education relating to the pension system operating principles in the 
Polish society. 
A wider analysis of detailed internal regulations in the area of gov-
ernance would be advisable, both in open pension funds and in general 
pension societies. The problem, however, is that such legal solutions 
have not been made public. This remark does not apply to principles 
of corporate governance in investment operations of open funds and 
their Articles of Association, which are publicly available. To explain 
the reasons for varying the rate of development of individual pension 
funds, the institutional analysis should be applied not only to formal 
institutions of corporate governance, but also informal institutions. The 
results of such analyses would allow for studying the issue of improv-
ing the effi ciency of Polish pension funds investment from a different 
perspective. 
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